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INTRODUCTION 
 Imagine this all-too-common scenario: almost every Saturday night, a 
group of girlfriends take a taxi to their favorite Las Vegas bar. It is a routine 
they rely on with confidence. But one night, a member of the group starts to 
feel sick and decides to head home early. Not wanting to ruin the other girls’ 
fun, she reassures them she will just grab a cab home—no worries! As she 
walks out of the bar and begins to look for a cab, she realizes there are no yel-
low cars in sight. After some time, she remembers a friend gave her a “free 
ride” code for Uber. She downloads the app, inputs the code, and finds a car 
just a few blocks away. She sighs with relief as the car pulls up in front of her. 
While her mind is preoccupied with her queasy stomach, she jumps in, assum-
ing that the car is the Uber she ordered. Like too many around the country re-
cently, this girl did not make it home safe and sound. 
Now rewind back to the moment before she jumped into a stranger’s car 
and ask yourself: Would you want your best friend to enter a barely marked car 
driven by someone who committed a sexual offense or whose dismissed mur-
der charge slipped through the cracks of a commercial background check? 
Would you want your mother to get into a stranger’s car whose fingerprints are 
not documented, or with a driver who could have created a false identity, now 
with the ability to disappear easily without a trace? How about your daughter, 
sister—or even yourself? The presumption of a safe and predictable cab ride is 
fleeting when you enter an unmarked, private car, potentially driven by an in-
sufficiently screened driver, with no safeguards available during the ride. This 
story is all too real, as countless accusations, charges, and convictions of Uber 
drivers continue to occur all around the world. 
If the legislators, regulators, and private companies at the forefront of this 
issue continue to fail to create strict safety standards, the less attractive Uber 
becomes.1 But if Nevada applies to Uber its pre-existing taxi provisions, with
the eventual implementation of safety measures like fingerprint background 
checks, SOS buttons, and cameras, passengers could have the confidence to ful-
ly utilize Uber’s many benefits. 
Uber will surely upset the taxicab monopoly and will change the outdated 
practice of always taking taxicabs in Nevada, but regardless of Uber’s benefits, 
protecting citizen safety must be paramount. Part I of this note introduces how 
transportation-networking companies have changed the transportation market. 
Part II highlights Uber’s long journey to legality in Nevada and the public safe-
ty concerns that Nevada’s regulations have failed to tackle. Part III addresses 
1  NAT’L ASS’N OF PROF’L BACKGROUND SCREENERS, BACKGROUND SCREENING—PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 2–3, https://www.omnidataretrieval.com/docs/industrynews/History 
BackgroundScreening.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EM2-TY99] (“[N]egative publicity associated 
with negligent hiring—especially as the result of a less than thorough background check—
can devastate the very foundation of a trusted organization.”) (last visited Nov. 4, 2016). 
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background check standards for transportation-network companies in Nevada 
in comparison to Nevada taxicab standards. Part IV discusses three possible so-
lutions to help counter the current lax requirements in Nevada. Finally, Part V 
considers the monetary realities of the suggestions presented in Part IV. 
I. REVOLUTIONIZING THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY: AN INTRODUCTION
TO TRANSPORTATION-NETWORK COMPANIES 
It is nearly impossible to go a day without using modern technology. Since 
the invention of the smartphone, users have become accustomed to an almost 
instantaneous answer to any problem.2 And while traditional means of transpor-
tation have become more convenient, the recent combination of transportation 
and technology has revolutionized daily routines and furthered the need for in-
stant convenience.3 However, this combination can be flawed; with an in-
creased desire for companies to stay competitive and meet growing demand, a 
gap in user safety becomes inevitable absent adequate regulations and protec-
tions. 
The California Public Utilities Committee first coined the name “transpor-
tation-networking company” (“TNC”).4 A TNC is “an organization . . . that
provides prearranged transportation services for compensation using an online-
enabled application (app) or platform to connect passengers with drivers using 
their personal vehicles.”5 Recognizing this new service—by hosting open dis-
cussions and developing regulations—the committee hoped to ensure public 
safety while encouraging innovation and convenience.6
The recent popularity of sharing economies paired with simple and conven-
ient smartphone applications made this service desirable to millennials.7 TNCs
connect customers with nearby drivers through a visual application that pro-
vides a price range to the desired destination, information on the driver and his 
2  See generally Om Malik, The Long History of the Fight Against Uber, NEW YORKER (June 
26, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-long-history-of-the-fight-against-ub 
er [https://perma.cc/Q7R8-TH5J]. 
3  See generally MARKETLINE, UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC.: CALLING A CAB FOR THE TAXI
INDUSTRY? 8 (2014). 
4  Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, Proposed Decision, Decision 
Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While Allowing New Entrants to 
the Transportation Industry 2 (Sept. 19, 2013). The California Public Utilities Company was 
assembled shortly after the first three TNCs officially launched in San Francisco in 2012. Id. 
at 4. 
5  Id. at 2. 
6  Id. at 4. 
7  See Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regula-
tion: The Case for Policy Change 3 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2014). See generally 
Ashley Stahl, A Millennial Manifesto: Why Gen Y Will Change the World, FORBES (Apr. 28, 
2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleystahl/2016/04/28/a-millennial-manifes 
to [https://perma.cc/4L7D-BS3B]. 
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or her vehicle, and the medium to pay.8 Additionally, drivers use their own ve-
hicles, which is the first of many cost advantages over traditional transportation 
models.9 Uber’s stated goal of creating accessible transportation in order to in-
crease users’ opportunities to “connect” with their city10 is dramatically chang-
ing the transportation norm because Uber is cost effective and easy to use. 
Two main technology-enabled transportation models currently exist: rides-
haring and ridesourcing.11 TNCs provide the ridesourcing services previously
described. Ridesharing is essentially a carpool service with the assistance of a 
smartphone application.12 In the 1980s and 1990s, ridesharing dramatically in-
creased in popularity, and by 2004, technology-enabled ridesharing services 
became available.13 Ridesharing uses a technology platform to group travelers
in a private vehicle, all with a similar destination, with the goal of saving travel 
costs, reducing emissions, and improving traffic congestion.14 Ridesharing fac-
es similar concerns as ridesourcing, including regulations, insurance, safety, 
and lack of customer awareness.15 But in contrast, ridesourcing does not pro-
vide the same environmental benefits as ridesharing, as a driver’s motivation to 
pick up riders is based on fare income.16 Thus, TNC drivers are incentivized to
make any trip available rather than providing incidental rides to pre-planned 
locations.17 TNCs’ spontaneity and convenience quickly became more appeal-
ing and user friendly than ridesharing. In sum, TNCs appear to be more similar 
to traditional taxi services with the ridesharing benefits of a smart phone appli-
cation used to quickly arrange individualized rides, or even to carpool.18 While
ridesourcing companies remain in limbo in the debate of what type of service 
8  See John G. Browning, Conning the IADC Newsletters: Emerging Technology and Its Im-
pact on Automotive Litigation, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 83, 84 (2014); see also Lisa Rayle et al., 
App-Based, On-Demand Ride Services: Comparing Taxi and Ridesourcing Trips and User 
Characteristics in San Francisco 2 (Univ. of Cal. Transp. Ctr., Working Paper No. UCTC-
FR-2014-08, 2014). 
9  See Malik, supra note 2. This note will not focus on the cost-effective benefits of transpor-
tation-networking companies, but presumably this benefit adds to Uber’s overall appeal. 
10  The Uber Story, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story [https://perma.cc/E68V-RV99] 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
11  See Rayle et al., supra note 8. 
12  Id. 
13  See SUSAN SHAHEEN, U.C. BERKELEY TRANSP. SUSTAINABILITY RES. CTR.,
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES AND RIDESOURCING: COMPARING TAXI AND 
TNC/RIDESOURCING TRIPS AND USER CHARACTERISTICS IN SAN FRANCISCO (Nov. 4, 2014). 
14  Rayle et al., supra note 8, at 2. 
15  MOBILITY INV. PRIORITIES, REAL-TIME RIDESHARING, http://mobility.tamu.edu/mip/strateg 
ies-pdfs/travel-options/technical-summary/real-time-ridesharing-4-pg.pdf [https://perma.cc/8 
2P2-G9R7] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
16  Rayle et al., supra note 8. 
17  Donald N. Anderson, “Not Just a Taxi”? For-Profit Ridesharing, Driver Strategies, and 
VMT, 41 TRANS. 1099, 1100–01 (2014) (describing characteristics of TNC services). 
18  See generally Rayle et al., supra note 8; Announcing UberPool, UBER NEWSROOM (Aug. 
5, 2014), https://newsroom.uber.com/announcing-uberpool [https://perma.cc/W3V4-2R67]. 
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they provide and what type of regulations are required, users and TNCs contin-
ue to push for their service to be executed everywhere because the benefits are 
extremely desirable to the current technologically-advanced generation.19
There are multiple TNCs in the market, but this note specifically focuses 
on Uber—the world’s largest TNC.20 Uber incorporated in Delaware in 2010
and serves more than eight million users worldwide.21 Uber’s 160,000-plus
U.S. drivers22 pride themselves on being independent contractors for a technol-
ogy company, not a transportation company.23 With a pre-money valuation of
$17 billion as of July 2014, Uber’s impressive growth is attributed to the appli-
cation’s convenience and reliability.24 If Uber plans to continue providing thou-
sands of people with flexible employment opportunities and convenient rides, it 
must put customer safety at the top of its priority list. 
II. UBER DRIVERS REJOICE! HOW NEVADA EVENTUALLY LEGALIZED
TRANSPORTATION-NETWORKING COMPANIES 
A coy and mischievous smile emerges as you see the flashing lights, hear 
the cliché sound of coins dropping into the metal slot machine tray, and feel the 
warm desert air when a friend suggests a trip to Las Vegas. But once you arrive 
in the city of neon lights, you are faced with a transportation nightmare. It may 
begin with the large taxi line that greets your arrival at McCarran Airport, or 
when you try to arrange a ride to a club on the strip that is just a little too far for 
a woman in heels to reach on foot. 
With all of Las Vegas’s perks, transportation is without a doubt one of its 
pitfalls. When traveling to New York City, for example, you can choose be-
tween a taxi, bus, subway, or boat to get to your destination; but in Las Vegas, 
a taxi is your only realistic option. Without a variety of public transportation 
alternatives,25 locals and tourists alike craved the services provided by alterna-
tive-transportation companies. Likewise, TNCs found the idea of setting up 
shop in Nevada highly desirable because it is one of the most lucrative trans-
19  See Rayle et al., supra note 8, at 1. 
20  Scott Austin et al., The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club [https://perma.cc/BEN6-K4R5]. 
21  ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., COMPLAINT, REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION, INJUNCTION, AND 
OTHER RELIEF SUBMITTED BY THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 2–3 (2015). 
22  Ellen Huet, Uber’s Ever-Renewing Workforce: One-Fourth of Its Current U.S. Drivers 
Joined Last Month, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2015, 4:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellen 
huet/2015/01/22/uber-study-workforce [https://perma.cc/3AN3-C8PE]. 
23  See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
24  MARKETLINE, supra note 3, at 7, 9. 
25  In addition to taxis, there are bus routes and a monorail available. 
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portation markets, with over forty million annual visitors and more than $300 
million in annual taxi company revenue.26
Since the violent taxicab wars in Southern Nevada in 1969,27 concern for
safe tourism and general public wellbeing has driven the discussion toward 
stricter transportation regulations.28 However, the unfamiliarity and mystery of
Uber quickly revived those similar safety concerns. Amid much controversy, 
Uber launched its application in Nevada on October 24, 2014.29 To placate the
taxicab and transportation authorities, Uber focused its service on residential 
customers, avoiding the Las Vegas Strip and the airport.30 When Uber first
launched, it was not regulated, and the issue of public safety quickly became 
apparent.31 Fewer than five days after Uber launched its application, the Neva-
da Transportation Authority (“NTA”) and the state Attorney General’s office 
sought court orders from several district judges around the state to halt Uber’s 
operations in Nevada.32 While some judges ordered the company to stop oper-
ating until a hearing could be scheduled, others found no immediate public 
safety concerns.33 After forum-shopping accusations and multiple lawsuits
were filed, on November 25, 2014, Washoe County District Judge Scott Free-
man issued a statewide injunction banning Uber for failing to follow state 
transportation regulations.34
Throughout 2015, Uber, state regulators and legislators, the NTA, and 
countless other affected parties worked together to achieve legalization in Ne-
vada.35 While the journey came with many hurdles—namely the failure of Sen-
26 L.V. CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., 2015 LAS VEGAS YEAR-TO-DATE EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2015); see also NEV. TAXICAB AUTH., TAXICAB INDUSTRY STATISTICS:
SEPTEMBER 2015, at 7 (2015). 
27  Richard N. Velotta, ‘Taxi Wars’ of ‘60s Predate Today’s Stand-off with Uber, L.V. REV.-
J. (Nov. 29, 2014, 8:57 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/traffic-transportation/taxi-
wars-60s-predate-today-s-stand-uber [https://perma.cc/KK4K-S7AK].
28  Provides for the Permitting and Regulation of Transportation Network Companies: Hear-
ing on S.B. 439 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Labor & Energy, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. 
(Nev. 2015) (statement of Richard Bryan, Frias Transp. Mgmt. Co). 
29  Richard N. Velotta, Uber Begins Ride-Sharing Service in Vegas, Reno, L.V. REV.-J. (Oct. 
24, 2014, 6:19 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/uber-begins-ride-
sharing-service-vegas-reno [https://perma.cc/TNF6-ELSK]. 
30  See id. 
31  Kimberly Pierceall, Judge Denies Order to Stop Uber in Nevada, CNSNEWS.COM (Oct. 29,
2014, 6:34 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/judge-denies-order-stop-uber-nevada [http 
s://perma.cc/HA9A-6Q3M]. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Richard N. Velotta, Uber Temporarily Suspends Operations in Nevada, L.V. REV.-J.
(Nov. 27, 2014, 12:33 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada/uber-temporarily-
suspends-operations-nevada [https://perma.cc/VV97-6G2H]. 
35  “We remain committed to working with Nevada’s leaders to create a permanent regulato-
ry framework that affords Nevadans the flexibility and innovation offered by Uber,” stated 
Uber spokeswoman, Eva Behrend, in response to the court’s ruling. Eric M. Johnson, Rides-
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ate Bill 439 in April36 and peaceful protests by members of taxi unions in
May37—TNCs finally crossed the finish line. On May 29, 2015, Governor Bri-
an Sandoval signed Assembly Bills 175 and 176, which, inter alia, set up the 
regulatory framework, imposed a 3 percent fare tax, and put TNCs under the 
jurisdiction of the NTA.38 On September 11, 2015, fewer than three months lat-
er, the NTA adopted the final regulations and began to review TNC applica-
tions.39 Irrespective of some Nevada counties’ requirements of local business
licenses, Uber officially became active in Nevada on September 15, 2015.40
Uber’s limited time in Nevada since legalization has come with great suc-
cesses and great struggles. By early 2016, Nevada had approximately 19,000 
TNC drivers.41 In January 2016, the Reno-Tahoe Airport began to allow TNCs
to pick up customers42—a major victory for Uber, since airport transactions are
a major source of taxi revenue. However, some unfortunate incidents with 
TNCs have occurred since they began operating legally in Nevada. For exam-
ple, an individual identifying as an Uber driver solicited a plain-clothes police 
officer after assuring this potential passenger that he did not need the Uber app 
to pay the $20 ride fare.43 In mid-2016, a passenger who was not scheduled
haring Firm Uber Suspends Operations in Nevada, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2014, 7:07 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nevada-ridesharing-idUSKCN0JB18J20141127 [http 
s://perma.cc/8H7R-43PK]. 
36  Sandra Chereb, Senate Rejects Bill to Allow Ride-Sharing in Nevada, L.V. REV.-J. (Apr. 
15, 2015, 8:26 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada-legislature/senate-rejects-
bill-allow-ride-sharing-nevada [https://perma.cc/CE2J-9DAS]. 
37  See Richard N. Velotta & Ricardo Torres, Taxi Drivers Stage Peaceful Protest Against 
Uber on the Strip, L.V. REV.-J. (May 29, 2015, 10:13 PM), http://ww 
w.reviewjournal.com/business/taxi-drivers-stage-peaceful-protest-against-uber-the-strip [http
s://perma.cc/J8FP-T89F].
38  See Taxi Drivers Protest, Governor Signs Ride-Sharing Bill, NEWS 3 L.V. (May 29, 2015), 
http://news3lv.com/archive/taxi-drivers-protest-governor-signs-ride-sharing-bill [https://per 
ma.cc/9EN7-GUN8]. The first five million dollars collected in each biennium of the three 
percent tax will go to the Highway Fund, with the remainder going to the state’s general 
fund. STATE OF NEV. GOVERNOR’S FIN. OFFICE, SILVER SAGE REVENUE REPORT AUG. 3, 2016,
at 1 (2016). 
39  See Nevada Board Adopts Regulations for Ride-Hailing Companies, FOX 5 VEGAS (Nov. 
20, 2015, 1:48 PM), http://www.fox5vegas.com/story/30011003/nevada-board-adopts-
regulations-for-ride-hailing-companies [https://perma.cc/2PCS-3UDU]. 
40  See Richard N. Velotta & Ben Botkin, Uber, Lyft Up and Running, Defy Clark County, 
L.V. REV.-J. (Sept. 15, 2015, 6:14 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/traffic-
transportation/uber-lyft-and-running-defy-clark-county [https://perma.cc/S8NS-KNPB].
41  Michelle Rindels, As Industry Shifts, Las Vegas Cabs Do Some Soul-Searching, L.V. SUN 
(Feb. 11, 2016, 2:00 AM), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2016/feb/11/as-industry-shifts-las-
vegas-cabs-do-some-soul-sea [https://perma.cc/5DKV-EHLM]. 
42  See Olivia DeGennaro, Reno-Tahoe Airport Allows Uber Drivers to Pick People Up, Taxi 
Drivers React, NEWS 4 (Jan. 20, 2016), http://mynews4.com/news/local/reno-tahoe-airport-
allows-uber-drivers-to-pick-people-up-taxi-drivers-react [https://perma.cc/8QLW-MZBD]. 
43  Richard N. Velotta, Transportation Regulators Investigate 2 Incidents Involving Uber 
Drivers, L.V. REV.-J. (Oct. 4, 2015, 11:45 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/traffic-
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through the app to be picked up allegedly stabbed an Uber driver.44 In an effort
to combat any more hiccups in its history in Nevada, Uber’s website offers rec-
ommendations and regulations for drivers in Las Vegas, including guidelines 
such as: “Do not pick up riders directly on the Strip. . . . Do not wait in taxi 
lines. Do not stage on casino properties. Do not accept cash for rides. Do not 
give fare quotes or estimates to riders.”45 While Uber users have not reported
dangerous incidents in Nevada like those experienced by other users around the 
country, as of this note’s writing, the potential for an Uber horror story may be 
just around the corner. 
III. WITH GREAT LEGALIZATION COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY: SAFETY
CONCERNS FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS 
Uber’s controversial and prolonged evolution in Nevada should have pro-
vided Nevada’s legislators and regulators ample time to proactively address the 
countless safety concerns other states faced while legalizing and regulating 
TNCs.46 However, the signed assembly bills 175 and 176, and accompanying
regulations fall short in safeguarding Nevada’s unique customer base, especial-
ly compared to Nevada’s pre-existing taxi regulations and other jurisdiction’s 
TNC regulations. 
 When Uber first began operating in Nevada in late 2014,47 taxi drivers
urged TNCs to follow the already-established taxi regulations,48 because those
regulations were designed to protect the unique passengers and transportation 
market in Nevada.49 Despite the taxi industry’s pleas for equal regulations, Ne-
vada created lax regulations for TNCs, essentially disregarding the state’s vio-
                                                                                                                                 
transportation/transportation-regulators-investigate-2-incidents-involving-uber-drivers [http 
s://perma.cc/DY4F-CDBR]. 
44  Parker Collins, Uber Driver Stabbed in Downtown Las Vegas, KTNV (Apr. 2, 2016, 
10:38 AM), http://www.ktnv.com/news/uber-driver-stabbed-in-downtown-las-vegas [https: 
//perma.cc/ZSE9-T225]. 
45  Local Regulations, UBER L.V., http://lasvegas.ubermovement.com/local-regulations
[https://perma.cc/SD8V-BTVY] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
46  See Richard N. Velotta, Taxi Exec Calls Proposed Uber, Lyft Rules a ‘Public Safety Dis-
aster’, L.V. REV.-J. (Aug. 11, 2015, 2:36 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/traffic-
transportation/taxi-exec-calls-proposed-uber-lyft-rules-public-safety-disaster [https://perma.c 
c/TY29-J4VC] (“It appears that Nevada is unable to learn from the misadventures of other 
states with TNCs.”). 
47  Velotta, supra note 29. 
48  Velotta, supra note 27. See generally infra Part III. 
49  Velotta, supra note 27 (“Taxi regulations are overseen by the Nevada Taxicab Authority, 
which was established in 1969 after more than a decade of confrontations among cabdrivers 
that casino executives feared were getting so violent that they would discourage tourists 
from coming to Las Vegas.”). 
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lent history with taxicabs, and the present-day news stories and litigation push-
ing for increased safety measures.50
A. Different Requirements for Essentially the Same Service
Nevada Assembly Bills 175 and 176 established the background-check re-
quirements for TNC applicants.51 This section will discuss the background-
check requirements for TNC drivers in Nevada in comparison to the require-
ments for taxi drivers—specifically, eligibility based on past criminal acts and 
who bears the responsibility for the manner in which the background checks in 
Nevada are conducted. 
When a driver applies to become an Uber driver,52 the TNC conducts a
background check from commercially available criminal-history and sex-
offender-registry databases53 and reviews the applicant’s driving record.54 A
driver must be at least nineteen years old, and possess a valid driver’s license 
and a DMV-registered vehicle.55 An applicant cannot have been found guilty of
driving under the influence (“DUI”),56 nor can the applicant’s name appear on a
database with sex-offender-registry information, regardless of the time period.57
The applicant cannot be found guilty of terrorism, an act of violence, a sexual 
offense, fraud, theft, damage to property, or a felony involving the use of a ve-
hicle in the previous seven years.58 This section of the signed bills provides the
most opportune avenue for the legislature to implement strict standards to pro-
tect passengers from potentially dangerous drivers. 
While the legislature appointed the NTA to further regulate TNCs, the 
NTA failed to properly fill in the blanks. The cracks in the regulations are glar-
ing when compared to the requirements of Nevada taxi drivers and to those of 
TNCs in other states. Nevada taxi companies must follow strict requirements 
50  Id.; see also infra Part III.B. See generally, e.g., Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., 
Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2015 WL 314131 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2015); Manzo v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. 13-C-2407, 2014 WL 3495401 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014); Yellow Grp. v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 12 C 7967, 2014 WL 3396055 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2014). 
51  Assemb. B. 175, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. § 30 (Nev. 2015); Assemb. B. 176, 2015 Leg., 
78th Sess. § 29 (Nev. 2015). 
52  Assembly Bills 175 and 176 provide requirements for the entire state, while counties 
within in the state have the opportunity to make additional minimal requirements. Assemb. 
B. 175 § 44(2); Assemb. B. 176 § 44(2).
53  See infra Part IV.A. for more discussion on the important distinction between commer-
cially available databases versus state-run databases used for background checks. 
54  See Assemb. B. 176 § 29. For excessive driving violations, Nevada has a three-year time 
limit. Id. § 29(3)(f). However, this note focuses solely on the issues presented by criminal 
background—and not driving record—violations. 
55  Id. § 29(3)(a)–(c). 
56  Id. § 29(3)(h). 
57  Id. § 29(3)(j). 
58  Id. § 29(3)(i). 
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when vetting their drivers. An applicant is required to: (1) be a resident of the 
state for the previous thirty days, (2) have a valid driver’s license, (3) provide a 
physician’s certificate to verify the driver has met certain health requirements,59
(4) list all convictions and pending court cases, (5) take a test to measure ability
to read and speak English, (6) get fingerprinted, (7) document child support sta-
tus, and (8) attend a Driver’s Awareness Program.60 Then, the Nevada Criminal
History Repository—a statute-established “filing cabinet” of Nevada criminal
history records61—runs the applicant’s fingerprints through an in-state, crimi-
nal-record check, which are then forwarded to the FBI for a more detailed re-
view.62
Some of the regulations for taxi drivers, however, do seem more lax than 
TNCs. For example, a taxi driver cannot have any DUI convictions within the 
previous three years and cannot have been convicted of any felony within the 
previous five years.63 However, taxi regulations provide a catch-all provision
eliminating applicants if the NTA finds a driver morally unfit or detrimental to 
the public.64 “Morally unfit” or a danger to public safety65 may include being
responsible for an accident resulting in death of or injury to another, being a 
habitually reckless or negligent driver, frequently violating traffic laws, com-
mitting an offense in another state that would have resulted in revocation of a 
license in Nevada, or being convicted of any sexual or moral turpitude of-
fense.66 Thus, allowing the NTA more discretion when screening drivers.
Throughout the long journey to TNC legalization, the opposition—mostly 
taxi companies and taxi unions—disagreed with the significant differences be-
tween the two services’ background-check requirements.67 Generally, the NTA
did not oppose TNCs in Nevada, but it believed that taxis were regulated for a 
reason and that TNCs should be subject to the same requirements—in-depth 
59  The applicant must obtain a certificate from a licensed physician if found to meet the 
health requirements established by Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation 49 C.F.R. 
§ 391.41. NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.8842 (2015). The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation
requires that thirteen health conditions be met, including no history of certain heart and res-
piratory diseases, no use of Schedule I narcotics, and no diagnosis of alcoholism. 49 C.F.R.
§ 391.41(b) (2015).
60  Driver Permit Requirements, NEV. TAXICAB AUTH., http://taxi.nv.gov/Driver_In 
fo/Driver_Permit_Requirements [https://perma.cc/ES5Q-VSXS] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016); 
see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.8841 (2015). 
61  Mission Statement and History, NEV. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY: GEN. SERVS. DIV.,
http://gsd.nv.gov/About/Mission [https://perma.cc/J7QK-TVSE] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
62  See id. 
63  Driver Permit Requirements, supra note 60. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
67  See Yellow Checker Star Transportation, Position Statement in Opposition to SB 439 and 
SB 440, at 7 (Mar. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Position Statement]. 
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background checks, commercial insurance, vehicle-safety standards, and con-
sistent, reasonable, and stable fares and rates.68
One major, and concerning, difference lies between the two sets of regula-
tions—namely, the process Uber uses to decide which applicants it considers 
safe drivers versus the NTA’s long established screening procedure for taxi 
drivers. The first difference is who conducts the background check. Uber uses a 
third-party company, Checkr, to conduct a commercial background check 
based on a driver’s name, address, license number and state, and social security 
number.69 This process is clearly less rigorous than the NTA’s additional re-
quirement that the Nevada Criminal History Repository and the FBI run an ap-
plicant’s fingerprints.70 While a private company may use databases with simi-
lar records, the state’s repository and the FBI database are regulated and 
provide more secure and accurate archives of a driver’s criminal history.71
The second issue is what driver’s information is used to conduct a back-
ground check. TNC’s commercial background check uses basic personal in-
formation to search third-party databases.72 This check can result in many er-
rors ranging from name misspellings or use of aliases to out-of-date and 
unverified information.73 Name-based background checks have a potential error
rate of 43 percent, compared to a roughly 1 percent potential error rate with 
fingerprint background checks.74 Further, fingerprinting is one of the most im-
portant components of any background check regimen because fingerprints are 
true identifiers and cannot be falsified.75 The FBI has been the national reposi-
tory for fingerprints and criminal history since 1924; the accuracy, consistency, 
and continuity of records are far superior to third-party commercial data 
searches.76 TNCs and their supporters counter the effectiveness of fingerprints
68  Id. at 1. 
69  CHECKR, https://checkr.com [https://perma.cc/RCM7-43NL] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016); 
see Tracey Lien, Kalamazoo Shootings: Here’s How Uber Does Its Background Checks, 
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-
uber-background-check-20160222-story.html [https://perma.cc/4S6F-5ULE]. Uber previous-
ly used a company called Hirease to conduct its background checks. Complaint, at 8, Doe v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-04670, 2015 WL 5915994 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015) [herein-
after Doe Complaint].
70  Driver Permit Requirements, supra note 60. 
71  MATTHEW W. DAUS & PASQUALINO “PAT” RUSSO, ONE STANDARD FOR ALL: CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR TAXICAB, FOR-HIRE, AND TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANY 
(TNC) DRIVERS 11 (2015); MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T L.
PROJECT, WANTED: ACCURATE FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 (2013). 
72  See Doe Complaint, supra note 69, at 8. 
73  DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 10. 
74  Id. at 86. 
75  Id. at 11, 15. 
76  Id. at 73–74. 
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by focusing on the cost, potential inconveniences,77 and occasional imperfec-
tions in the system.78 Uber promotes the benefits of their three-step back-
ground-check process and their driver review function as a sufficient screening 
mechanism.79 Ultimately, the numerous reliability benefits and the public con-
fidence behind knowing their driver had a fingerprint background check far ex-
ceed any inconvenience to the potential driver or company.80
The third issue is which criminal records Uber accepts, particularly because 
a decent percentage would not be acceptable to the NTA. TNC regulations al-
low convicted sexual offenders to drive for Uber, while taxi regulations explic-
itly forbid it. For an Uber applicant, there must be at minimum seven years 
since the applicant’s sexual offense conviction before becoming a driver.81
There may not be much assurance in the review of an applicant’s name in a 
sex-offender database as the background checks review the sex-offender regis-
tries maintained by each state.82 Some states restrict what names are allowed to
be posted on sex-offender registries information and	   11 percent of sex-
offender-registry information has been found to have critical errors,83 which is
likely increased when searches are conducted through unofficial commercial 
databases. Further, according to Uber’s website, information regarding approx-
imately 25 percent of registered sex offenders in California cannot be posted to 
online registries, significantly reducing the reliability of Uber’s background 
check process.84 Comparatively, the NTA may choose not to grant licenses to
drivers who have committed sexual crimes or moral turpitude offenses, regard-
77  See Curt Woodward, Uber CEO Says Fingerprint-Based Background Checks Can Be 
‘Discriminatory’, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/12/ 
01/uber-ceo-says-fingerprint-based-background-checks-can-be-discriminatory [https://perm 
a.cc/PL77-93S8].
78  Uber’s blog contains numerous convoluted reasons why their background check require-
ments are superior to fingerprinting. See Details on Safety, UBER NEWSROOM (May 12, 
2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/details-on-safety [https://perma.cc/GMM8-7ZB2]. 
79  Id. According to Uber’s website, the review function is where “riders rate their experience 
at the end of every trip, and drivers do the same. Uber regularly reviews that feedback and, 
through this process, we’re able to create and maintain a safe and respectful environment for 
riders and drivers.” Feedback Is a Two-Way Street, UBER NEWSROOM (Apr. 23, 2014), 
https://newsroom.uber.com/feedback-is-a-2-way-street [https://perma.cc/HWJ2-YKAH]. 
80  DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 6, 74–75. 
81  Assemb. B. 176, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. § 29(3)(i) (Nev. 2015). 
82  Id § 29(2)(b)(2). 
83  DOUGLAS R. HOFFER, STATE OF VT. OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR, SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRY: QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY WARRANTS ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS 2 (July 14,
2014); see also DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 11. 
84  Details on Safety, supra note 78; Sex Offender Registration and Exclusion Information, 
STATE CAL. DEP’T JUSTICE: OFFICE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/sex 
reg.aspx?lang=ENGLISH [https://perma.cc/WGL4-QFXT] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016) 
(“[A]pproximately 25% of registered sex offenders cannot be posted online by law. Whether 
public disclosure is permitted is based on the type of sex crime for which the person is re-
quired to register.”). 
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less of the time frame with the catch-all regulatory provision.85 Current TNC
regulations are concerning because sex-related crimes, or similar moral turpi-
tude offenses, are crimes that an individual likely does not just commit once, as 
compared to, for example, a battery.86 While all sex offenders may not
reoffend, the opportunity to have control over a passenger may put the driver in 
the position to more likely reoffend than if employed in a less-intimate envi-
ronment. The significant differences in the how strict the regulations for each 
service are may be one reason for the increased amount of sexually related in-
cidents involving Uber drivers than taxi drivers. The different standards for taxi 
and Uber drivers are substantial and must be addressed, especially when both 
are giving rides to the vulnerable population in Nevada, including travelers 
from all over the world, intoxicated individuals, both tourists and locals. Since 
the two services do not greatly differ in their main function, the regulations 
should not be so inconsistent. 
Moreover, major cities like New York City and Houston already require 
fingerprint background checks for Uber drivers.87 The requirements for drivers
in New York City and in Nevada are frighteningly different, even though their 
consumers are similar, vulnerable tourists. In New York City, a driver must 
complete a physical examination by a licensed doctor, obtain an upgraded Class 
E license, take a defensive driver’s course, take sex-trafficking-awareness train-
ing, pass a drug test, and submit to fingerprinting.88 Houston requires its TNC
drivers to undergo a five-panel drug test, physical examination, warrant check, 
and fingerprinting with the Texas Department of Public Safety.89 Cities in Cali-
85  Driver Permit Requirements, supra note 60. 
86  Presence of the following factors may increase an individual’s tendency to commit a sex-
ual assault: “physiological/biological (e.g., imbalanced hormones, being sexually attracted to 
children); sociocultural (e.g., being exposed to broader social messages supportive of aggres-
sion); developmental/environmental (e.g., having witnessed domestic violence); and situa-
tional/circumstantial (e.g., having easy access to victims, extreme levels of stress).” CTR. FOR
SEX OFFENDER MGMT., FACT SHEET: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS 3
(2008); see, e.g., Karen Kersting, New Hope for Sex Offender Treatment, 34 MONITOR
PSYCHOL. 52 (2003) (“People commit sexual crimes for different reasons . . . . Some are 
highly predatory, highly psychopathic and have repeated offenses, making them more likely 
to reoffend.”). Further, in California, there is even a state institution specifically for sexual 
offenders who have completed their sentence, but are still deemed dangerous to the commu-
nity. Department of State Hospitals – Coalinga, CA. DEP’T. STATE HOSPS., 
http://www.dsh.ca.gov/coalinga [https://perma.cc/98ME-XQBJ] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016) 
(“The fundamental goal of the DSH-Coalinga Sex Offenders Treatment Program is for the 
individual to acquire pro-social skills and to prevent recurrence of sexual offending.”). 
87  Douglas Hanks, Uber Faces Fingerprinting Fight in Miami-Dade, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 
25, 2016, 6:44 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article62532202.html [https://perma.cc/W8MV-NR62]. 
88  N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, DRIVER NEW APPLICATION AND CHECKLIST
REQUIREMENTS (PART B) (2016); TLC License Checklist, UBER N.Y.C., http://driveuber 
nyc.com/tlc-license-checklist [https://perma.cc/FX4S-MZ7R] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
89  Letter from Christopher Newport, Mayor’s Chief of Staff, Houston, Texas, to Honorable 
Ann Kitchen, Council Member, Austin, Texas (Oct. 15, 2015) (on file with the author). 
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fornia and Massachusetts, Austin, Chicago, and Atlanta are all currently debat-
ing fingerprinting for Uber background checks, several of which are supportive 
of the requirement.90
B. What Have Uber Drivers Done?
The troubling experiences suffered by Uber passengers at the hands of 
drivers around the world demonstrate the urgency and necessity for increased 
safety protections. For example, in 2014, a Chicago Uber driver faced allega-
tions he sexually assaulted a female passenger.91 A Los Angeles driver was ac-
cused of kidnapping a young woman from a club and taking her to a hotel to 
sexually assault her.92 In Boston, a driver allegedly drove a young woman to a
secluded area, locked her in the vehicle, then choked and raped her in the 
backseat.93 In San Francisco, an Uber driver allegedly attempted to kick angry
passengers out of his car by hitting one of the passengers with a hammer, after 
they chastised the driver’s choice of routes.94 In Washington, D.C., an Uber
driver ran a red light, deviated from the planned route, and took the passengers 
on a high-speed joyride to evade a lighted taxi inspector.95 In 2015, a Los An-
geles driver reportedly yelled at a female passenger before violently grabbing 
her arm and throwing her out of his vehicle.96 In Denver, an Uber driver alleg-
90  Airport Aims to Use Uber Drivers’ Fingerprints to Check Past, FOX NEWS (Mar. 28, 
2016), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/03/28/airport-aims-to-use-uber-drivers-fingerprints 
-to-check-past.html [https://perma.cc/QMH3-YSC6]; Jim Dallke, Uber and Lyft Won’t Face
Fingerprinting in Chicago—at Least for Now—Under New Regulations, CHI. INNO (June 22,
2016, 1:50 PM), http://chicagoinno.streetwise.co/2016/06/22/uber-and-lyft-wont-face-
fingerprinting-in-chicago-at-least-for-now-under-new-regulations [https://perma.cc/5Q3B-2
W4L].
91  Uber Driver in Chicago Accused of Sexual Assault, CBS NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014, 11:49 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/chicago-police-investigate-uber-driver-accused-of-rape 
[https://perma.cc/J34M-DWAT]. 
92  Veronica Rocha, Uber Driver Accused of Kidnapping Clubgoer, Taking Her to Motel, 
L.A. TIMES (June 3, 2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-uber-
driver-kidnapping-hotel-20140603-story.html [https://perma.cc/AAY7-VH4E].
93  Dara Kerr, Who’s Really Taking You for an Uber Ride?, CNET (Dec. 22, 2014, 5:00 
AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/whos-really-taking-you-for-an-uber-ride [https://perma.cc/ 
N22L-HCVB]. 
94  Dara Kerr, How Risky is Your Uber Ride? Maybe More than You Think, CNET (Oct. 8, 
2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/how-risky-is-your-uber-ride-maybe-more-than-
you-think [https://perma.cc/TU7Q-VQG4]. 
95  Julie Zauzmer & Lori Aratani, Man Visiting D.C. Says Uber Driver Took Him on Wild 
Ride, WASH. POST (July 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-
gridlock/wp/2014/07/09/man-visiting-d-c-says-uber-driver-took-him-on-wild-ride [https://pe 
rma.cc/C8U9-JAH8]. 
96  Carman Tse, Woman Says Uber Driver Called Her a ‘F*cking B*tch’ and Threw Her on-
to the Street, LAIST (June 4, 2015, 4:38 PM), http://laist.com/2015/06/04 
/uber_driver_behaving_badly.php [https://perma.cc/4MEV-M3CE]. 
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edly drove a passenger to the airport and then returned to rob her house.97 In
New Jersey, a young Uber driver was charged with four counts of sexual as-
sault after being invited back to the victim’s house with some of her friends.98
All too many similar incidents plague Uber’s reputation, and dangerous inci-
dents continue to occur regularly.99
In August 2015, the San Francisco District Attorney filed a complaint al-
leging twenty-five drivers with serious criminal records including murder, child 
abuse, and assault, passed Uber’s background checks and were cleared to 
drive.100 Two months later, a lawsuit filed in Northern California alleged that
Uber failed to protect two female riders against sexual assault, stating that Ub-
er’s marketing campaigns focused more on maximizing profits than on protect-
ing female passengers.101 Most of the news reports, lawsuits, and public outcry
blame insufficient background checks for these safety lapses. Since pre-
employment background checks are designed to screen out employees that may 
cause a company potential issues later, the accuracy and type of background 
checks are vital.102 Of course, some taxi users may experience dangerous situa-
tions and issues with their drivers, but strict safety regulations and rigorous 
background checks help limit the frequency of those occurrences.103 While
states differ in their background-check requirements, Nevada, with its economy 
based largely in tourism and entertainment,104 must make safety a greater con-
cern than what is currently in place.105
97  Tara Fowler, Uber Driver Allegedly Drove Woman to Airport, Then Went Back to Rob 
Her Home, PEOPLE (Apr. 1, 2015, 9:45 AM), http://www.people.com/article/uber-driver-
arrested-attempted-burglary [https://perma.cc/L4GX-DFA9]. 
98  Jessica Remo, Driver Accused of Raping Customer Worked for Uber, NJ.COM (Aug. 28, 
2015, 10:51 AM), http://www.nj.com/union/index/ssf/2015/08/driver_accused_of_rap 
ing_customer_worked_for_uber.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter [http:// 
perma.cc/4FWJ-RNKC]. 
99  See generally Reported List of Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft, WHO’S DRIVING YOU?, 
http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents [https://perma.cc/RRX6-KTY2] (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
100  See Complaint, at 11–13, State v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-543120, 2014 WL 
6911066 (Cal. Super. Dec. 9, 2014); Matt Weinberger, Uber Hired a Convicted Murderer 
Who Applied with a Fake Name, Complaint Claims, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 19, 2015, 7:45 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-background-check-civil-suit-2015-8 [https://perma.cc/ 
D8JJ-W8MA].
101  Doe Complaint, supra note 69, at 2. 
102  DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 8. 
103  See generally Adrienne LaFrance & Rose Eveleth, Are Taxis Safer than Uber?, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/03/are-taxis-
safer-than-uber/386207 [https://perma.cc/6QTE-GSMQ]. 
104  See generally Doresa Banning, A Boon to Nevada’s Economy: Tourism Growth, NEV.
BUS. (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.nevadabusiness.com/2016/02/a-boon-to-nevadas-economy-
tourism-growth [https://perma.cc/85UY-ELE9]. 
105  See Position Statement, supra note 67, at 1–7. 
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These incidents around the United States have prompted Uber’s develop-
ment of different strategies in an attempt to address the issue of safety, but the 
company’s ideas, albeit creative, do not fix the root of the problem.106 For ex-
ample, Uber created a safety advisory board, consisting of police chiefs, attor-
ney generals, professors, et cetera, to “provide critical recommendations and 
counsel . . . to develop new methods and technologies that reduce risk and in-
crease safety for riders, drivers, and the public.”107 Further, Uber now monitors
its drivers’ acceleration speed through the driver’s smart phone in an effort to 
flag dangerous driving.108 While these efforts may help long-term goals for saf-
er rides, it does not prevent problems; rather it provides information after the 
fact that requires some type of subsequent enforcement or punishment to have 
any effect. 
When you book a ride through Uber, you should be able to expect a safe 
journey to your destination. But with recent horror stories, this presumption 
may no longer be reliable. While Uber conducts cursory background checks109
from the driver’s basic personal information, do these procedures sufficiently 
ensure passenger safety? 
IV. NEVADA’S UNIQUE POPULATION DESERVES SAFE RIDES FROM SAFE
DRIVERS 
Nevada’s unique market and customer base call for more intense safe-
guards than are currently required. The state’s all-night lifestyle encourages 
many vulnerable passengers to use Uber’s convenient service. The allure of us-
ing a mobile application to find a ride home, along with the non-cash payment 
method, makes Uber an ideal choice for both tourists and locals who have taken 
full advantage of the Vegas nightlife. Uber’s marketing seems to target this 
crowd, while insufficiently protecting them. The campaign, “drink up, and Ub-
er on,”110 encouraged susceptible passengers to enjoy a ride service from driv-
ers who are arguably as risky as driving while intoxicated. Uber recently part-
nered with Mothers Against Drunk Driving (“MADD”) and conducted a study 
on Uber’s effect on DUI incidents.111 The study found a 10 percent decrease in
106  For example, drivers are now placing “Bop It” toys in their backseats to help keep intoxi-
cated passengers preoccupied during the drive. Danny Yadron & Nellie Bowles, Uber Moni-
toring Drivers in US in Attempt to Flag Dangerous Driving, GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2016), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/26/uber-monitoring-drivers-us-passenger-
safety-houston [https://perma.cc/TRB7-B7J3]. 
107  Joe Sullivan, Announcing Uber’s U.S. Safety Advisory Board, UBER NEWSROOM (Nov. 
24, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/safetyadvisoryboard [https://perma.cc/5CHE-UGUD]. 
108  See Yadron & Bowles, supra note 106. 
109  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
110  Doe Complaint, supra note 69, at 2. 
111  See Making Our Roads Safer—For Everyone, UBER NEWSROOM (Jan. 27, 2015), 
https://newsroom.uber.com/making-our-roads-safer-for-everyone-2 [https://perma.cc/BM6L-
RA3Q]. 
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DUI arrests since Uber entered Seattle in 2014.112 Uber’s “peak hours” were
found to be at the same time as most DUI crashes and arrests, and 93 percent of 
respondents to a survey—after hearing the study’s finding on Uber’s impact on 
decreasing DUI’s—said they would recommend Uber to their friends if they 
had been drinking.113 Uber encourages intoxicated people to avoid the dangers
of drinking and driving by promising a safe ride—by under-screened drivers. 
To better protect Nevadans and tourists, and to support the decrease in 
drunk driving incidents, Nevada should require video recording in each TNC 
vehicle, fingerprint background checks, and an in-application emergency but-
ton, allowing passengers not only to feel safe, but also be more safe. Much of 
this note’s suggestions stem from the public’s reaction after an Uber driver in 
India allegedly raped his passenger.114 India is Uber’s second-largest market
after the United States, and this incident had a detrimental effect on Uber’s 
popularity in the country.115 Protests sparked India’s ban on the service in the
capital of New Delhi when the young female victim filed suit against the com-
pany.116 This devastating incident was the catalyst for Uber’s introduction of
new safety features in India, including the in-application emergency button.117
However, the momentum to implement in-car video recording, conduct stricter 
background checks, and create safety alert buttons has slowed, as the majority 
of Uber’s users are still lacking protection. 
A. Uber Driver Background Checks Should Require Fingerprinting
In Nevada, taxi drivers are required to pay for and to comply with finger-
printing through the Nevada Repository; the fingerprints are subsequently 
transferred to the FBI for a full review of the driver’s criminal history.118 Uber
routinely argues that fingerprint background checks are not worth the time and 
money, stating the process has faults.119 However, Nevada’s unique riders de-
serve a higher level of protection, which could be accomplished through re-
quirements similar to those implemented in taxis after the 1969 taxicab riots.120
112  UBER & MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING (MADD), MORE OPTIONS. SHIFTING 
MINDSETS. DRIVING BETTER CHOICES. 3 (2015). 
113  See id. at 4–10. 
114  Dan Levine, Delhi Uber Passenger Who Alleges Driver Rape Sues in U.S., REUTERS 
(Jan. 29, 2015, 5:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/29/us-india-uber-lawsuit-
idUSKBN0L22NP20150129 [https://perma.cc/SVQ7-NLKH]. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Driver Permit Requirements, supra note 60. 
119  Kate McGee, After Sexual Assault Reports, Uber, Lyft May Face Expanded Background 
Checks, KUT.ORG (Dec. 14, 2015), http://kut.org/post/after-sexual-assault-reports-uber-lyft-
may-face-expanded-background-checks [https://perma.cc/779T-24HG]. 
120  Velotta, supra note 27. 
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Background checks vary in intensity depending on the purpose of the re-
view, from a simple criminal history search to drug testing and full criminal, 
civil, and economic review.121 Several organizations and companies provide
background check services; taxis utilize state-run repositories, while Uber uses 
third-party commercial companies.122 However, the National Association of
Professional Background Screeners urges that “[i]nformation provided by 
commercial databases should not be used as the sole source of information be-
cause of potential gaps in data, and the less than timely updates in some juris-
dictions.”123 Therefore, TNC drivers in Nevada should be screened more thor-
oughly to protect the vulnerable and unique users, and to be held at the same or 
similar standard as taxi drivers. 
Fingerprinting is the most important element of a background check be-
cause it is the only identifier that cannot be falsified or stolen, and with in-
creased technology, a national database will constantly grow and become more 
accurate.124 “The FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS) is the largest biometric database of criminals in the world. Clear, legi-
ble fingerprints form the foundation of the Fingerprint Master File, which con-
tinues to grow by approximately 13,000 records each day.”125 Fingerprinting is
an easy process for applicants. All that is required is a small fee and a short vis-
it to an approved fingerprint location, where an applicant’s fingerprints are col-
lected electronically using live scanning machines.126
Further, fingerprinting is more secure because fingerprints are made up of 
different patterns, ridge structures, and other characteristics, which are unique 
to each individual.127 A fingerprint submission through IAFIS is processed in
one hour and twelve minutes.128 The FBI’s website encourages the use of fin-
gerprinting for background checks because it provides positive identification 
and eliminates falsities found with name-only searches.129 Uber, however, rou-
tinely rejects the importance of fingerprint background checks because they are 
121  NAT’L ASS’N OF PROF’L BACKGROUND SCREENERS, supra note 1, at 2. 
122  According to Uber’s website, California Uber applicants are reviewed through Checkr. 
See Details on Safety, supra note 78. 
123  NAT’L ASS’N OF PROF’L BACKGROUND SCREENERS, supra note 1, at 8. 
124  DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 11. 
125  FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, RECORDING LEGIBLE FINGERPRINTS,, 
http://archstl.org/files/field-file/FBI%20FINGEPRINT%20INFORMATION%20AND%20 
TIPSHEET.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEU6-W6C5] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
126  DAUS & RUSSO, supra note 71, at 12. 
127  Id. at 16 (“There are at least 150 individual ridge characteristics on an average finger-
print. If between 10 and 16 points between two fingerprint images are matched up, they are 
considered to be from the same person.”). 
128  Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160612100902/https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints 
_biometrics/iafis/iafis [https://perma.cc/T79T-NENG] (last visited June 12, 2016). 
129  FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL FINGERPRINT BASED BACKGROUND CHECKS
STEPS FOR SUCCESS (Nov. 2014). 
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logistically difficult and do not always include a court’s final ruling if a charge 
is dismissed or altered, thereby discriminating against some applicants.130 But
the solution does not have to be black and white—namely fingerprint versus 
commercial checks. For example, if an applicant is flagged as having a criminal 
record after a fingerprint background check, a review process or commercial 
background check can be subsequently conducted. No matter how many 
searches or databases Uber claims to review in its commercial background 
checks, if Uber is not using biometrics, its applicant-review process will never 
be sufficiently accurate, nor equivalent to taxi-driver requirements.131
As explained in a letter from Houston’s mayor’s office to a few city coun-
cil members, a recent TNC driver, who passed the Hirease background check, 
was found to have twenty-four aliases, five listed birthdays, ten listed social se-
curity numbers, and an active warrant for arrest, all through a City of Houston 
fingerprint background check.132 Congressional representatives pushed Uber
and similar TNCs to increase their background-check requirements because of 
the recent and horrific sexual assaults committed by their drivers.133 “By using
comprehensive fingerprint-based background checks, . . . companies can each 
do their part to reduce the likelihood of similar crimes from occurring in the fu-
ture.”134 District attorneys also have asked their legislatures to require finger-
print background checks when creating regulations for TNCs.135 National or-
ganizations have publicly pleaded for Uber to better protect women and other 
vulnerable populations from potentially dangerous drivers who have not been 
effectively screened.136
130  See Woodward, supra note 77. 
131  As stated by Emily LeBlanc, Director of Safe Place, “[s]ometimes that means going 
above and beyond what is required of us by law to do the right thing because it’s the right 
thing even if it costs us money or makes our jobs a little more difficult.” McGee, supra note 
119. 
132  Letter from Christopher Newport to Honorable Ann Kitchen, supra note 89. 
133  Letter from Rosa L. DeLauro, Member of Cong., et al. to Travis Kalanick, Co-Founder & 
Chief Exec. Officer, Uber Techs., Inc., et al., (Mar. 9, 2015) (on file with the author). 
134  Id. 
135  Letter from David F. Capeless, Dist. Att’y, Berkshire, Mass., to Senator James B. El-
dridge, Chair, Joint Comm. on Fin. Servs., & Representative Aaron Michlewitz, Chair, Joint 
Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Jan. 13, 2016) (on file with the author); see also Matt Murphy, DAs 
Back Fingerprinting of Drivers for Uber and Lyft, LOWELLSUN.COM (Jan. 22, 2016, 8:32 
AM), http://www.lowellsun.com/news/ci_29418219/das-back-fingerprinting-drivers-uber-
and-lyft [https://perma.cc/5BQM-MGDT]. 
136  See Mass NOW INC Statement: Ride Hailing Services Have Responsibility to Address 
Safety Concerns, MASS. CHAPTER NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, http://www.massnow.org/2015/ 
mass-now-inc-statement-ride-hailing-services-have-responsibility-to-address-safety-concer 
ns [https://perma.cc/M34T-YW7D] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016); McGee, supra note 119. 
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B. Video Recording in Vehicles Can Protect Both Drivers and Passengers
The smaller cameras can be made, the more dialogue there is about imple-
menting video recording for various safety purposes. For example, legislators 
around the country are pushing for mandatory body cameras on all law-
enforcement officers because the cameras deter crime, keep officers and the 
public accountable, and can provide hard evidence for investigations.137 The
successful implementation of body cameras and dash cameras for police offic-
ers and cameras in taxis suggests the potential for similar success if cameras are 
required in TNCs. In the United States, large, crime-prone cities like Chicago, 
New York, Seattle, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Francisco require cam-
eras in taxis.138 In the mid-2000s, the NTA rejected a proposed regulation re-
quiring the NTA to implement cameras in taxis, and instead ordered “a one-
137  See generally David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as 
Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357, 
362 (2010). 
138  See Daarel Burnette II, In Chicago Cabs, More Cameras Will Be Along for Ride, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 22, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-04-22/news/ct-met-cab-
cameras-20100422_1_cab-owners-bullet-resistant-partitions-cameras 
[https://perma.cc/A8JE-ZY58]. In Chicago,  
[t]he tiny camera sits above the rear-view mirror and takes a panoramic picture of the cab when
someone enters, or when the fare meter is turned on, and as they leave. Cabs must have signs in-
forming passengers they will be photographed. Drivers who feel threatened can push a panic
button to get more pictures of the passengers.
Id.; see also Stephanie Chuang, Bay Area Taxi Cabs Add to Growing Trend of Using Dash-
cams, NBC BAY AREA (Feb. 17, 2015, 11:43 PM), http://www.nbcbayar 
ea.com/news/local/Bay-Area-Taxi-Cabs-Add-to-Growing-Trend-of-Using-Dashcams-29214 
6711.html [https://perma.cc/XZB5-PX2C]; Paul Nussbaum, Temporary OK for Ride-Share 
Firms in Pittsburgh; Cameras for Philly Cabs, PHILLY.COM (July 26, 2014), http://www.phil 
ly.com/philly/business/transportation/20140725_Temporary_OK_for_Uber__Lyft__cameras
_for_Philly_cabs.html [https://perma.cc/KUD4-GMTF]. Additionally, some countries like 
Australia, Canada, and Sweden have required cameras in taxis for several years to protect 
their passengers. See, e.g., Safety Cameras in Taxis, TAXI SERVS. COMM’N,
http://taxi.vic.gov.au/drivers/taxi-drivers/driver-safety/safety-cameras-in-taxis [https://perm 
a.cc/H4DA-HZFX] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016) (implementing safety cameras into taxicabs
by the State Government of Victoria, Australia began in 2001, finding that “[t]he cameras
deter violence and assist Victoria Police in identifying and catching those responsible for
attacks against drivers[]”); Ho Shan et al., Beijing’s Spy in the Cab, RADIO FREE ASIA (Aug.
1, 2008), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/taxi-08012008065129.html [https://perma.c
c/R49K-QPNP] (discussing the implementation of video cameras and satellite technology
that transmits live audio feed from Beijing taxicabs “for monitoring and linguistic analysis”);
Taxi Cameras in British Colombia, PASSENGER TRANSP. BD., http://www.ptboard.bc.ca/
cameras.htm [https://perma.cc/8MKD-V8Z3] (explaining the use of taxi cameras throughout
British Colombia and various other provinces in Canada, because “[t]axi cameras deter
crime and help police identify suspects and prosecute offenders”) (last visited Nov. 5, 2016);
Taxi Cameras Prevent Robbery, POINTGUARD, http://www.pointguard.se/latest-news/taxi-
cameras-prevent-robbery [https://perma.cc/WVT8-VBN8] (last visited Nov. 5, 2016) (find-
ing Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention statistics demonstrate the use of taxi
cameras in Sweden has been an “important contributing factor” in the decrease of assault and
robberies on taxi drivers).
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year test run to study the effectiveness of cameras deterring crime.”139 Several
groups, like the ACLU, opposed the regulations because of the potential Fourth 
Amendment violations with the implementation of such cameras;140 even so,
most Nevada taxis are now equipped with cameras.141
While this note focuses on the risks that passengers face, it is important to 
note that cameras also protect drivers. Consistently throughout the 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s, the national average of passenger-inflicted murders of taxi-
cab drivers was thirty-eight per year.142 The factors that create such a high-risk
environment for taxi drivers are the same as those TNC drivers face because 
both types of drivers work with the public, alone, often at night, and in some 
high-crime areas.143 Although, one of the major environmental differences be-
tween the two is that taxis still mostly utilize cash transactions, which is likely 
a promoter of passenger-inflicted crime. Taxi industries have tried to combat 
these dangerous conditions with different safety measures like shields, cameras, 
and driver panic buttons.144 However, some of these safety measures may not
translate smoothly to TNCs. For example, shields are unrealistic to place in 
personally owned vehicles,145 and though shields are a deterrent of assaults in
taxis, the goal of shields in taxis is primarily to protect against robbery and 
robbery-related assaults; this is not a significant danger with TNCs, given that 
drivers do not accept cash.146
139  Taxicab Authority Rejects Plan for Cameras in Cabs, L.V. SUN (Feb. 25, 2004, 8:33 
AM), http://lasvegassun.com/news/2004/feb/25/taxicab-authority-rejects-plan-for-cameras-
in-cabs/ [http://lasvegassun.com/news/2004/feb/25/taxicab-authority-rejects-plan-for-camer 
as-in-cabs/]; see Proposed Regulation of the Taxicab Authority, LCB File No. R114-03 
(Aug. 25, 2003). With about 60 percent of taxicabs having camera systems installed, the 
NTA tried again in 2005 to create regulations to require cameras in all taxicabs. Taxicab Au-
thority Starts Over on Rules for Cameras in Cabs, L.V. SUN (July 12, 2005, 9:33 AM), 
http://lasvegassun.com/news/2005/jul/12/taxicab-authority-starts-over-on-rules-for-cameras/ 
[https://perma.cc/9TH6-33ZE]. 
140  See Letter from Christine M. Guerci-Nyhus, Senior Deputy Att’y Gen., State of Nev., to 
Yvette G. Moore, Adm’r, Nev. Taxicab Auth. 1 (Oct. 5, 2005) (on file with the author). 
141  Id. at 2; Velotta, supra note 46. 
142  Letter on Proposed Regulation 126-8 from Brett A. Berman, on behalf of Freedom Taxi 
et al., to Dennis Weldon, Gen. Counsel, Phila. Parking Auth. 6 (Apr. 7, 2014) (on file with 
the author). 
143  Id. 
144  Id. at 7. 
145  It would be difficult to require shields in Uber vehicles because Uber drivers are current-
ly not employees but independent contractors, thus Uber has less control over their vehicles. 
Further, it would be difficult to maintain large shields in almost every type of car, as taxi ve-
hicles are mainly only a few models. Uber drivers likely would also not like the inflexibility 
of a shield in their personal vehicles as many drivers are part-time and pick up passengers on 
their way to work, or when it is convenient. 
146  See Letter on Proposed Regulation 126-8, supra note 142, at 6; see also Cammie K.C. 
Menéndez et al., Effectiveness of Taxicab Security Equipment in Reducing Driver Homicide 
Rates, 45 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED., no. 1, 2013, at 6. 
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However, the benefits of camera use in taxis would be replicated if they 
were required in all TNC vehicles. There are many cameras available, like 
dashboard replacement rearview-mirror cameras,147 wide angle lens Go-Pros,148
and even drivers’ cellphone cameras. Because most drivers would be unwilling 
to purchase a separate camera, and the required maintenance and external en-
forcement may be easily neglected, a driver’s cellphone camera is likely the 
best option. Drivers already use their phones to pick up drivers and navigate 
rides; therefore, the extra feature of video recording would be more convenient. 
Additionally, because Nevada’s distracted driving statutes discourage drivers 
from using their cellphones while driving,149 most drivers already have a cell-
phone stand located near the center console.150 This placement may be an ideal
means to record as much of a car’s interior as possible while remaining plugged 
into a charging source in the vehicle. Further, this placement would make the 
phone visible to riders, alerting them of the video surveillance—along with 
some kind of posted warning of the video recording—which has been shown to 
be the most effective method of reducing crime in taxicabs.151
The safety features suggested here are not designed to solve all of the prob-
lems that may arise. Rather, this note intends to encourage increased safety 
measures, while still shedding light on the difficulties that may impede the im-
plementation of the suggested safety measures. Requiring cameras in Uber ve-
hicles invites discussion of both constitutional and logistical152 issues.
147  See e.g., Falcon Zero F360 HD DVR Dual Dash Cam, Rear View Mirror, 1080p, 32GB 
SD Card, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00E56WY18/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UT 
F8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B00E56WY18&linkCode=as2&tag=you
086-20&linkId=BNTTO43TMR4UJFZD [https://perma.cc/429A-CFB9] (last visited Nov. 6,
2016).
148  See e.g., GoPro HERO3+: Silver Edition, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/ 
B00F3F0EIU/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=B00F3
F0EIU&linkCode=as2&tag=you086-20&linkId=4ZN6DQ5KY7VRSDD5 
[https://perma.cc/FCK8-AB6N] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
149  NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165 (2015) (“Using handheld wireless communications device 
to type or enter text, send or read data, engage in nonvoice communication or engage in 
voice communications without use of hands-free device unlawful; exceptions; penalty; addi-
tional penalty for violation in work zone or pedestrian safety zone.”). 
150  See Dom Esposito, Like Opening an Apple Product: Here’s What Uber Sends New Driv-
ers (Video), 9TO5MAC (Aug. 18, 2014), http://9to5mac.com/2014/08/18/like-opening-an-
apple-product-heres-what-uber-sends-new-drivers-video [https://perma.cc/UUE6-FKLM]. 
151  Menéndez et al., supra note 146, at 5. 
152  The main logistical problem with implementing wide-view cameras in taxis was the 
shield’s placement because it greatly reduced the interior view. See Letter on Proposed Reg-
ulation 126-8, supra note 142, at 7. Additionally, in 2005, spot checks in cities with cameras 
found that many cameras were non-functional and most had technical difficulties. Id. at 8; 
see also Menéndez et al., supra note 146, at 5. However, these problems are not likely to oc-
cur if cameras are required in TNCs because there is no shield, and updated technology since 
attempts to implement cameras in taxis lessens the likelihood of technical problems. 
The next major problem is the price. As discussed above, the most effective camera 
would be the driver’s phone. It would be a significantly less expensive and more reliable op-
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1. Constitutional problems with cameras in Uber cars
The constitutional issues found throughout taxi-camera implementation 
debates will inevitably be raised if TNCs are required to have video record-
ing.153 However, the differences between taxis and TNCs, and the distinctions
in the purposes behind using cameras, may alter the framework of the discus-
sion. There are two avenues for cameras to be introduced in Uber vehicles: (1) 
through a mandate from Uber, or (2) through state legislation or regulation. If 
Uber mandates its drivers to use video recording, a passenger’s privacy rights 
under the Fourth Amendment are not implicated, eliminating any constitutional 
tion. However, the price of data is the main financial concern with requiring driver’s to use 
their personal phones. Passing on the cost to the customers through a fare increase may be 
the best option. Otherwise, there is the looming issue of whether Uber or the state has custo-
dy of the footage if one pays for the data. For example, if the state lowers the mandatory tax 
on Uber to counter the increased data costs, in combination with the state’s action of requir-
ing cameras, it the state would likely have control of the footage. While not having control of 
the footage may benefit Uber in the employee v. independent contractor debate, it is doubtful 
that the company would not agree to this arrangement. On the other hand, for example, if 
Uber contracted a deal with a network company to supply the necessary data, then Uber 
would have some control of the footage. The state may disapprove of this in fear of Uber not 
cooperating in releasing footage or a similar legal battle like Uber is currently facing in Cali-
fornia for failing to turn over detailed trip records. See Laura J. Nelson et al., Uber Should be 
Suspended in California and Fined $7.3 Million, Judge Says, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2015, 
5:59 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-suspended-20150715-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z4V2-L8QK]. While there may be many alternatives to combat the price of 
cameras, this is a major concern that could halt the implementation of cameras in Uber vehi-
cles. 
The third logistical problem is who has access to the footage. Similar to the debate sur-
rounding requiring police officers to have body cameras, access to the footage must be pro-
tected. First, the footage should not be able to be saved on the driver’s phone to avoid the 
possibility of a driver deleting footage. Second, it must be determined whether the footage 
would be sent and stored at a government agency like the NTA or local law enforcement, or 
at an Uber office. Third, as addressed above, the custody of the footage must be decided up-
front to avoid potential legal issues after implementation. The fourth issue is in what situa-
tion could footage be released. This could be defined in the current Nevada regulations that 
already require drivers to turnover of trip records, for example if the footage is under Uber’s 
discretion, then proper legal requests for footage will need to be outlined. Fifth, the amount 
of time footage would be stored for is an important consideration. This may depend on many 
factors, including who has custody of the footage, the average surveillance video life in other 
contexts like police body and taxicab cameras, and the situations where actual video record-
ing in an Uber is allowed. These concerns may seem daunting but should be preemptively 
decided to avoid inevitable issues in the future. 
Further, there may be enforcement issues in implementing cameras in vehicles because 
drivers may disable the camera feature, place their phone in a position where the video 
would not sufficiently record the vehicle’s cabin, or attempt to block the camera. Additional-
ly, problems may arise if the cameras malfunction, and the logistical and price concerns of 
guaranteeing functional cameras. While there are many logistical concerns for implementing 
cameras in Uber vehicles, the long-term benefits likely outweigh these hurdles. 
153  See generally Letter from Christine M. Guerci-Nyhus to Yvette G. Moore, supra note 
140, at 1. 
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issues.154 If the state requires video recording by, for example, the NTA intro-
ducing regulations that require it, Uber would be bound by the regulation to 
remain operating in Nevada. But when a government action directs a result, like 
requiring cameras, Uber actually implementing the cameras is considered a 
government action, and constitutional protections are triggered.155 The Fourth
Amendment protects individual privacy against certain government intrusions; 
therefore, requiring video recording in an Uber, initiated by the government, 
may be subject to Fourth Amendment protection.156
In a Fourth Amendment analysis, courts balance the extent of the surveil-
lance against a passenger’s legitimate expectation of privacy.157 To invoke
Fourth Amendment protections, and for the latter element of the balancing test, 
an individual must show that he or she had a reasonable or legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy.158 To establish a legitimate expectation of privacy, an individu-
al must demonstrate a personal expectation that his activities would be private, 
and he must show that his expectation was one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as reasonable—that is, satisfying both a subjective and an objective 
test.159 Courts have held that a passenger in a taxi has a reasonable expectation
of privacy because the taxi temporarily becomes a private place.160 The passen-
ger has a significant degree of control over the taxi’s services because the pas-
senger pays a fare, decides the destination, and can exclude others from the 
ride.161 The Courts’ holdings in taxi privacy cases emphasized the passenger’s
154  Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 183 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating workplace 
video surveillance is not within personal privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment). How-
ever, Uber’s other legal battles may deter the company from requiring cameras. For example, 
Uber is currently facing lawsuits regarding the issue of whether drivers are independent con-
tractors or employees. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015). Uber is fighting to keep drivers as independent contractors and requiring drivers 
to use video recording would likely counter Uber’s position as it would be increased control 
on its drivers. See id. at 1137 (“Uber contends it exercises minimal control over how its 
transportation providers actually provide transportation services to Uber customers, an im-
portant factor in determining whether drivers are independent contractors.”); see also Tess 
Townsend, Why Uber Doesn’t Want to Fingerprint Drivers, INC. (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://www.inc.com/tess-townsend/uber-rethink-backgrounds.html [https://perma.cc/QSK6-
5PGJ] (“If the company does adopt more rigorous background checks, which could include 
fingerprinting, drivers seeking classification as employees could try to use the move as evi-
dence they are indeed employees and not private contractors.”). 
155  See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991). 
156  See United States v. Corona-Chavez, 328 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2003). 
157  Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Nev. 2002). 
158  United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2000). 
159  Id.; Young v. State, 849 P.2d 336, 340 (Nev. 1993). 
160  See, e.g., Chapa v. State, 729 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (hold-
ing a passenger in a taxi had a reasonable expectation of privacy because the passenger exer-
cised a significant degree of control over the taxicab). 
161  NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.8846 (2015) (stating taxicab drivers cannot take a passenger to a 
destination other than the one requested by the passenger); NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.8849(1)(e) 
(2015) (stating a taxicab driver cannot allow another person in the taxi unless the original 
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control over the taxicab, demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
which is the same control held by an Uber passenger. The TNC customer pays 
a fare and determines the location through the application, and, unlike rideshar-
ing, the passenger can exclude others from riding. Additionally, Uber’s policy 
against ride solicitation162 further establishes a passenger’s control over the ve-
hicle.163 In sum, since the passenger pays a fare, decides the destination, and
can exclude others from entering, an Uber passenger would have an objective 
expectation of privacy just like a passenger in a taxi. 
While Nevada has not specifically addressed privacy rights in taxicabs, 
case law involving locations where an individual may have an expectation of 
privacy provide a guide. For example, there is no expectation of privacy when 
two employees are recorded when “talk[ing] too loudly” in the workplace.164
The Court reviewed several factual circumstances to determine whether there 
was a subjective expectation of privacy, including the individual’s inability to 
exclude others from a retail store, the ability of other employees to hear, and 
the size of the store.165 Further, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a driv-
er has no reasonable expectation of privacy for the bumper of their car because 
the exterior of the car is open to public view and subject to visual inspection by 
anyone.166 The Nevada Supreme Court has also held that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy for an individual engaged in sexual activity in a door-
less stall in a public restroom because Fourth Amendment protection is not af-
forded to activities that a person knowingly exposes to the public.167 Converse-
                                                                                                                                 
passenger requests it). Both statutes emphasize a passenger’s control over the vehicle by way 
of restricting taxicab drivers from having control over the destination or additional passen-
gers. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352, 361 (1967) (finding a public telephone 
booth to be a temporarily private place and using a taxicab as an example for similar places 
where an individual may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment); United States 
v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that passenger has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because the passenger, by paying a fare in a taxicab, has contracted the right
to exclude others from the car and determine its destination); United States v. Santiago, 950
F. Supp. 590, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing a passenger’s Fourth Amendment privacy
rights in a taxicab because in effect, the passenger area belongs to the passenger); Chapa,
729 S.W.2d at 728 (holding a passenger in a taxi had a reasonable expectation of privacy
because the passenger exercised a significant degree of control over the taxicab).
162  Driver Deactivation Policy, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/deactivation-policy/us-
multi-lingual/en [https://perma.cc/5Q4G-S64Z] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016) (“To maintain the 
transparency and safety of the Uber platform for all users, activities conducted outside of the 
monitored system of the Uber app—like anonymous pickups—are prohibited.”). 
163  In 2014, Uber introduced UberPool, a new service that allows for users to share rides to 
similar destinations for a cheaper price. In this service, a Fourth Amendment analysis may 
differ because with UberPool, a passenger does not have the same level of control over the 
ride, lessening their reasonable expectation of privacy. See Announcing UberPool, supra 
note 18. 
164  Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (D. Nev. 1985). 
165  Id. at 1264. 
166  Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002). 
167  Young v. State, 849 P.2d 336, 342 (Nev. 1993). 
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ly, a passenger preserves reasonable privacy rights by entering an Uber with the 
intention of shutting the door to separate oneself from the public. 
However, passengers cannot expect total privacy because of the driver’s 
presence. But the driver is a non-public service provider who must abide by the 
passengers’ instructions;168 therefore, while passengers may not expect com-
plete privacy, they may expect privacy from government surveillance during 
the ride. Nevertheless, even if passengers have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, it must be balanced against the extent and purpose behind the video re-
cording.169
Not all government surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment.170 For
example, video recording public places is no more than documenting what can 
be viewed by the naked eye.171 Thus, a passenger’s entry and exit from an Uber
is not subject to protection because it is open to visual and auditory observa-
tion. However, governmental recording of a passenger within the vehicle is 
very different. Courts review the reasonableness of the governmental intru-
sion172 by balancing the intrusion against legitimate government interests.173
Courts have recognized the differing degrees of intrusion and have generally 
held that a defendant has a reasonable expectation to be free of constant sur-
veillance.174 Some of the government’s interests in having cameras in Uber ve-
hicles would be to ensure the safety of the drivers and passengers and to pro-
vide identification of suspects if an incident occurred. While the government’s 
goals in the taxi-camera debate were almost the same, one key difference is in 
those debates, the government focused only on the safety of the driver, not the 
passenger. Many courts acknowledge the legitimate public interest in prevent-
ing crime against taxicab drivers.175 The recent crimes against Uber passengers
and the several pending criminal cases would likely be enough to demonstrate 
legitimate government interests in ensuring passenger safety as well as driver 
safety. Therefore, the government’s interest in protecting both drivers and pas-
sengers in Uber vehicles may tip the scale in favor of the increased intrusion 
inherent in the use of in-vehicle cameras. 
By this analysis, if a passenger were only recorded for a minimal portion of 
their ride, it would likely be considered a reasonable intrusion into the passen-
ger’s privacy rights. But, the reasonable amount of time to record a passen-
ger—without violating the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights—would be 
168  NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.8846 (2015). 
169  Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1205 (Nev. 2002). 
170  United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). 
171  Id. 
172  Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1204–05. 
173  Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004) (internal citation omitted). 
174  United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987). 
175  United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000); State v. White, 818 A.2d 361, 
366 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002); People v. Abad, 771 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y. 2002). 
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longer in an Uber compared to in a taxi, because the government’s main inter-
est would be passenger safety, as opposed to solely driver-safety interests in 
taxis. Uber should mirror taxi regulations and limit the amount of time surveil-
lance is conducted. This would include recording the entry and exit of the pas-
senger, the interior cabin once a passenger presses an SOS button in the appli-
cation, and minimal recording in the event of a G-Force occurrence, meaning 
sudden stops, swerving, and excess braking.176 First, as discussed supra, the
Fourth Amendment does not protect the surveillance of a passenger’s entry and 
exit because it is already visible to the public. Second, pressing an SOS button 
demonstrates the passenger’s consent to recording and presumably does not vi-
olate the driver’s rights because the driver is aware of this feature, and, in most 
states, one party can consent to recording.177 Third, minimal recording in a G-
Force event promotes the government’s interest in the safety of the driver and 
passenger, and the limited recording is not a significant intrusion on the pas-
senger’s privacy rights.178 Further, additional deterrent measures could be add-
ed to advance the government’s goal, like a visual red light when the camera is 
recording and posted signs explaining which portions of the ride may be rec-
orded. 
Additionally, to avoid any possibility of a Fourth Amendment violation, 
Uber could give notice of video recording prior to a customer’s accepting a 
ride. For example, when a user opens the Uber application to request a ride, an 
identifying mark on the visual depiction of the closest vehicle would alert users 
which vehicles feature video recording. Then, the customer would be prompted 
to overtly accept that the vehicle has video recording. A notice warning may be 
a win-win for both Uber and the state because more people may be inclined to 
use Uber if there is video recording, especially intoxicated travelers or solo rid-
ers. Further, with gradual implementation, users who do not want to be record-
ed can still choose an Uber without a camera. 
176  Michael A. Litschi, Video-Based Driver Risk Management Systems: Evaluating Effec-
tiveness at Improving Transit Safety 5 (June 2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis, San José State 
University). 
177  See generally Letter from Christine M. Guerci-Nyhus to Yvette G. Moore, supra note 
140. With increased technology, it is possible that new surveillance triggers may be even
more effective. For example, with Apple’s new iPhone 6 feature of no-touch voice activated
“Siri,” Uber’s application may be able to incorporate a similar feature where a voice signal
can trigger recording, like multiple uses of “no,” “stop,” or a yell or scream.
178  Litschi, supra note 176, at 44. Recording would be triggered when “atypical vehicle 
movements occur, such as sudden braking or acceleration, swerving, sharp turns, or the im-
pact of a collision.” Id. This information can then be used for training purposes, self-
evaluation, or other data driven purposes. Id.; see also Letter from Christine M. Guerci-
Nyhus to Yvette G. Moore, supra note 140, at 11. Further, recording these events can help 
determine what happened during an accident or incident on the road. Uber has already begun 
monitoring the movements of its drivers through their phones’ accelerometers. See Yadron 
& Bowles, supra note 106. 
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Ultimately, cameras are worth the constitutional and logistical hurdles be-
cause they safeguard passengers by deterring crime and providing identification 
for investigations. Surveillance cameras are known to deter crime,179 and a vis-
ible camera in an Uber vehicle may allow passengers—and drivers—to think 
twice before doing anything inappropriate in the vehicle. In-vehicle video re-
cording can also help police solve disputes or crimes that may occur in the 
course of a ride. Many taxi drivers and passengers already enjoy the benefits of 
in-vehicle cameras, and despite the differences between taxis and Uber, the 
goal of safe rides remains the same for both. In sum, this note suggests either 
requiring constant video surveillance when a user requests an Uber, or allowing 
limited video recording in three situations: (1) entry and exit of passengers, (2) 
when a passenger pushes the SOS in-app button, and (3) when a G-Force event 
has occurred. 
C. Safety-Alert Buttons Should Be Available on the Uber App
In mid-2015, Uber unveiled its new SOS technology in India.180 The SOS
button connects users with local law enforcement almost instantaneously once 
pressed.181 When a user enters the vehicle, the passenger’s phone displays the
driver information—name, vehicle type, and license plate number—and a map 
display of the vehicle’s current location.182 The SOS button is located on the
home screen, and when users feel in danger, pressing the button will immedi-
ately connect the passenger to law enforcement—essentially speed dialing 
911—and a real-time alert with the vehicle’s GPS location is sent directly to a 
local police control room.183 According to Uber’s website, this alert will then
be “projected on a dedicated screen in the control room of local law enforce-
ment which has been set up by Uber’s safety experts.”184 The SOS button was
beta-tested in Kolkata, but the program requires a collaborative effort between 
the TNC and local law enforcement in order to be replicated in other cities.185
After similar reports of sexual assault in Chicago, Uber planned to integrate an 
179  NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., EVALUATING THE USE OF PUBLIC
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION—A SUMMARY 2 (2011). 
180  Introducing an Integrated SOS Alert Solution for Law Enforcement, UBER NEWSROOM
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://newsroom.uber.com/india/introducing-an-integrated-sos-alert-solu 
tion-for-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/B4VZ-9VWY]. 
181  Id. 
182  Alex Fitzpatrick, Uber Rolling Out ‘SOS Button’ That Helps Cops Track Cars, TIME 
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://time.com/3841811/uber-sos-button-india [https://perma.cc/WPQ7-XC 
GU]. 
183  Introducing an Integrated SOS Alert Solution for Law Enforcement, supra note 180. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
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SOS button into its application servicing Chicago by 2015.186 However, the
SOS button has yet to expand beyond a few cities in India. 
The SOS button should be featured and required in Uber’s application in 
Nevada. Clearly the technology is available, as it has been implemented in In-
dia, so the only reason it hasn’t been integrated is likely because of the necessi-
ty for collaboration with local law enforcement, potential costs, and presuma-
bly, Uber’s refusal to exert what may be perceived as control over its drivers 
because of the ongoing independent contractor and employee debate. 
First, the control center and logistical hurdles to coordinate and implement 
an SOS button costs money and requires cooperation and testing. The specific 
SOS-button system Uber has designed requires a control center, with comput-
ers and employees, at a local law enforcement agency.187 This type of program
is very similar to proposed taxi-alert buttons, except that taxi panic buttons are 
physically located in the taxicab for the driver while Uber’s button is in its ap-
plication.188 In one private company’s proposal for a taxi-alert button, when the
button is pressed, GPS coordinates are routed to a central service location 
where the information is quickly sent to local law enforcement, and an operator 
can make a one-way call to the cab to assess the severity of the situation.189
This one-way call may not help in all incidents, but two-way communication 
from the SOS button is possible because it would be conducted through the us-
er’s cellphone. A few cities already require, or plan to require, similar, physical 
panic buttons in their taxis and for-hire vehicles, and new safety-focused phone 
applications offer similar panic button features, so the premise and need are 
well established.190
Specifically, in Nevada, the NTA currently has a Public Safety Dispatch in 
place that receives emergency calls and employs approximately twenty-five en-
186  Uber ‘Panic Button’ to Be Available in Chicago, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 13, 2015, 9:25 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/technology/chi-uber-panic-button-chicago-2015021 
3-story.html [https://perma.cc/TM2U-JWG6].
187  Fitzpatrick, supra note 182. 
188  WIT SOFTWARE, TAXI ALERT: EMERGENCY SYSTEM AND TRACKING SOLUTION FOR
TAXICAB DRIVERS, , http://www.taxi-library.org/taxi-alert.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KQ6-8S77] 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
189  Id. 
190  See, e.g., N.Y.C. COUNCIL, DISTRESS SIGNALS FOR PASSENGERS IN TAXICABS, STREET 
HAIL LIVERIES, AND FOR-HIRE VEHICLES, INT. 0762-2015 (Apr. 28, 2015) (a bill introduced 
to the New York City Council requiring emergency buttons in the passenger compartments 
of taxis); Martin Di Caro, Passenger ‘Panic Buttons’ Coming to D.C. Cabs Over Industry 
Opposition, WAMU 88.5 AM. UNIV. RADIO (Apr. 7, 2016), http://wamu.org/news/16/ 
04/07/passenger_panic_buttons_coming_to_dc_cabs_over_industry_opposition [https://perm 
a.cc/6PQM-TV89]. Also, new smart phone applications provide similar panic buttons to be
used in various situations when an individual does not feel safe. SAFETREK,
https://www.safetrekapp.com [https://perma.cc/S2W4-JQAG] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
SafeTrek is an application that allows a user to hold their thumb on the in-app safe button
then, once they feel safe again, the user enters a pin number. Id. If a user ever feels unsafe
while pressing the button, they simply release the button and the local police are notified. Id.
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forcement agents.191 However, to implement the SOS button, Uber must still
collaborate with local law-enforcement agencies. This collaboration could be 
achieved if the NTA or Uber worked directly with local law-enforcement agen-
cies to accept Uber alerts in their control rooms. Trained police dispatch per-
sonnel would be the best option to respond to alerts and to relay the information 
to law enforcement officers. 
One problem is accidental usage of the SOS button. Since it is located on 
the application and not a physical button, it may be easier to press accidentally 
when entering the vehicle, throughout the ride, exiting, and—all too often in 
Nevada—by those who are intoxicated. Since dispatch personnel are trained to 
deal with accidental and false contacts, the instant phone connection once the 
button is pressed—similar to the one-way call in proposed taxi panic buttons—
may provide dispatch with enough information to efficiently and effectively as-
sess the situation and determine whether the alert is accidental or real. 
Currently, Nevada taxicabs have panic buttons accessible only to the driv-
er.192 As previously discussed, in implementing cameras in Uber, the pressing
of the panic button is one way the camera would be turned on.193 While there is
no pending legislation or public pressure for passenger-activated taxi panic but-
tons in Nevada, Uber’s voluntary implementation of such safety features could 
put pressure on taxis to follow. Even though an SOS button may be the most 
difficult and logistically complicated safety suggestion, Nevada should aggres-
sively push for implementation of this technology to further protect tourists and 
locals. 
V. UBER HAS THE MONEY, SO WHAT’S STOPPING IT FROM IMPLEMENTING
THESE SUGGESTIONS? 
One of the major reasons Uber has not already implemented these safety 
features in almost all of its worldwide markets is allegedly the cost. However, 
the Uber has access to safety-specific funds collected from rides, and the im-
plementation of the safety features pay for themselves in a relatively short 
amount of time. The benefits of introducing new safety features are worth the 
expense and can greatly improve Uber’s public image. 
Specifically regarding background checks, the excuse that they are expen-
sive is mostly unsound. In Nevada, a criminal history check, without finger-
191  See TOM ELY, NEV. TAXICAB AUTH., THE MISSION OF THE NEVADA TAXICAB AUTHORITY 
(2015). 
192  Revises Provisions Governing the Regulation of Taxicabs: Hearing on S.B. 432 Before 
the S. Comm. on Transp., 2013 Leg., 77th Sess. 6–7 (Nev. 2013) (statement of D. Neal Tom-
linson, Frias Transp. Mgmt. Co.). 
193  See generally Letter from Christine M. Guerci-Nyhus to Yvette G. Moore, supra note 
140.
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prints, through the Nevada Repository costs $38.25,194 but if Uber follows the
same process as used by Nevada taxi companies, the background screening, in-
cluding fingerprinting, costs $91.25 per applicant.195 Since Uber already pays a
large amount of money to commercial background companies, it is unlikely the 
price per applicant with a private company is significantly less than the $100.00 
fee for the process used by taxi companies.196 In conclusion, because of the sci-
entific proof and public perception that fingerprint background checks provide 
the most accurate review of an applicant, the legal pressure in regard to the al-
ready-practiced “safe-rides fee,” and the push from congressional representa-
tives, Nevada should mandate Uber drivers be subject to fingerprint back-
ground checks. 
Uber, and other TNCs, charge riders a “Safe Rides Fee.”197 The Safe Rides
Fee supports “the operation of the Uber platform, including a background 
check process, development of safety features in the application, incident re-
sponse and other operational costs.”198 This Safe Rides Fee varies, but, on av-
erage, it is $1.55 per ride.199 Originally, the Safe Rides Fee was designed to
fund background checks and twenty-four hours, seven days a week user ser-
vice, but the varying fees around the country seem to reflect Uber’s assessment 
of what cities are more dangerous and require more money to provide safe-
194  Memorandum from Tammy Trio, Admin. Servs. Officer II, Nev. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, on 
FBI Fee Change Effective February 1, 2015, to Civil Applicant Customer, http://gsd.nv. 
gov/uploadedFiles/gsd.nv.gov/content/FeesForms/Fingerprint_Fees_1_Feb_15/Fingerprint%
20Fee%20Change%20Eff%20Feb%201%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/JKZ8-NG8R] (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
195  Driving Permit Requirements, supra note 60. 
196  According to Checkr’s website, a commercial background check website used by Uber, a 
background check costs $35 for a “pro search” with an added charge of county court fees of 
$3.50 and an $8.00 DMV fee for Nevada, meaning approximately $50.00 per search. See 
Ryan Lawler, Y Combinator-Backed Checkr Automates Background Checks for the New, 
On-Demand Economy, TECHCRUNCH (July 24, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/07/24/ 
checkr [https://perma.cc/H57C-B4V9]; see also Additional Pricing Information, CHECKR, 
https://checkr.com/pricing/additional-pricing-information [https://perma.cc/PL2E-VQHK] 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
197  At the time this article was written, and discussed infra, Uber used the term “Safe Rides 
Fee.” However, Uber lost a class-action lawsuit over this fee and now refers to a similar fee 
as a “booking fee.” Uber’s website states that this booking fee “helps support safety initia-
tives for riders and drivers as well as other operational costs.” I Was Charged a Booking Fee, 
UBER HELP, https://help.uber.com/h/2949c48a-dc4c-4c2b-a389-2e2f5be5b0c6 [https://perm 
a.cc/4MC4-2T5W] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
198  Mario Trujillo, Uber to Pay $28 Million to Settle Safety Lawsuits, HILL (Feb. 11, 2016, 
5:56 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/269175-uber-to-pay-28m-to-settle-safety-
lawsuits [https://perma.cc/AY2M-CATN]. 
199  The safe ride fee ranges from $1.00 to more than $2.50 per ride. See Biz Carson, Here’s 
How Much Uber Charges for a ‘Safe Ride’ in Different US Cities, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 16, 
2015, 12:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-cities-with-highest-uber-safe-rides-
fees-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/TME8-QJ7A]. 
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guards.200 For example, during a southwest Las Vegas Uber ride in the early
morning hours of January 1, 2016, a passenger paid $9.81 for a less than four 
mile, nine minute long ride, which included charges of $2.00 for base fare, 
$4.34 for distance, $1.77 for time, and $1.70 for a “Safe Rides Fee.”201 Assum-
ing it is a flat fee, the amount of money Uber collects from this fee is astound-
ing. For example, the average Uber fare in mid-2015 was $13.36 per trip,202
and Uber’s website states there were 140 million rides in 2014.203 Assuming an
average Safe Rides Fee of $1.50 per ride, this amounts to $210 million annual-
ly.204 While this is not a specific or guaranteed amount reflecting what Uber has
actually collected from this fee, even a small percentage of this figure would 
easily fund the more extensive background checks, data for video recording, 
and funding to execute the SOS-button technology. 
Since the implementation of this extra fee in 2014, several lawsuits have 
sprung up around the country. Lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California in 2015 seek to hold Uber accountable for 
charging users this fee while claiming to provide “industry leading” back-
ground checks.205 Another suit in the same district alleges that Uber materially
misrepresents to riders that it provides the “safest rides on the road.”206 These
lawsuits claim that the Safe Rides Fees are not used for biometric-based back-
ground checks, regular motor vehicle checks, driver safety education, or any in-
application safety features.207 After this note was initially written, Uber settled
two class-action lawsuits for $28.5 million for misleading customers on its 
safety procedures and fees.208 Additionally, per the settlement, Uber agreed to
200  Id. 
201  This example is a personal experience of the author. 
202  Jacob Davidson, Here’s How Much the Average Ride Costs on Uber and Lyft, TIME (July 
15, 2015), http://time.com/money/3959091/uber-lyft-price-per-trip [https://perma.cc/HH5K-
GMNK]. 
203  Ellen Huet, Uber Says It’s Doing 1 Million Rides Per Day, 140 Million in Last Year, 
FORBES (Dec. 17, 2014, 4:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/17/uber-
says-its-doing-1-million-rides-per-day-140-million-in-last-year [https://perma.cc/U3SJ-DGK 
E]. 
204  There are many factors that could add or subtract from this number, but, after simple 
math of an average fee of $1.50 multiplied by 140 million rides, the total is $210,000,000. In 
First Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Mena v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-
00064-JST (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015) (ECF No. 28), plaintiffs calculated $20 million dollars 
in revenue from Safe Rides Fees received based on a $1 per ride assessment. 
205  See generally Sabatino v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-00363 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 
2015); Pappey v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-00064 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2015); Philliben 
v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 4:14-CV-05615-JST, 2014 WL 7384981 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2014).
206  Doe Complaint, supra note 69, at 11. 
207  First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 204, at 2. 
208  Uber Agrees to Payout to Clients over Safety Claims, CBS NEWS (Feb. 12, 2016, 5:11 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/uber-settle-lawsuits-safety-procedures-fees-cash-
payout-to-customers [https://perma.cc/T8G2-GRLF]. 
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“stop using certain ‘safety-related’ advertising language and would rename its 
‘Safe Rides Fee’ as a ‘Booking Fee.’ ”209
If Uber implements more rigorous background checks and safety features, 
it can avoid future lobbying and lawsuit costs. For example, as of 2014, Uber 
spent over $650,000 lobbying in California and at least $60,000 in Colorado, 
essentially to ensure that stricter background checks requirements did not pass 
the legislatures.210 The legal costs associated with the lawsuits in California,
and future similar lawsuits, could exceed hundreds of thousands of dollars, if 
not millions, if Uber is unsuccessful in this fight.211 Further, if Uber refuses to
improve its safety features, cities and countries may refuse to allow Uber ser-
vices to enter their market or may remove pre-existing services from their mar-
kets.212
CONCLUSION 
Uber’s fast growth and high profits are commendable, but it can only be 
sustained if the company proactively protects its customers. By putting state 
regulations and increased safety provisions in place, Uber’s goal of “safe rides, 
safer cities”213 can be achieved. The recent California court rulings on Uber’s
safety claims and practices is a win for consumers, as the company’s safety ad-
vertising will no longer be misleading. But the major victory would come from 
Uber living up to its promises of having “industry leading” background checks 
and truly creating the safest experience for its consumers. 
However, if Uber does not implement necessary safety initiatives on its 
own, Nevada must be prepared to protect its unique population and consider 
requiring these features as current regulations do not require important safe-
guards like “FBI or state-enhanced criminal background checks . . . drug testing 
. . . [d]river training . . . [d]river physicals . . . [c]ameras in vehicles to ensure 
driver and customer safety and surveillance . . . [and] [c]onspicuous markings 
209  Id. 
210  See Mike Isaac, Uber’s System for Screening Drivers Draws Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/technology/ubers-system-for-screening-driver 
s-comes-under-scrutiny.html [https://perma.cc/PL62-5PSM].
211  In early 2016, several of these lawsuits settled for $28.5 million, with Uber stating, “We 
are glad to put these cases behind us and we will continue to invest in new technology and 
great customer services so that we can help improve safety in the cities we serve.” See Uber 
Agrees to Settle Lawsuits Over Safety Claims Worth $28.5 million, BGR (Feb. 12, 2016, 
12:42 PM), http://www.bgr.in/news/uber-agrees-to-settle-lawsuits-over-safety-claims-worth-
28-5-million [https://perma.cc/FK2H-STYA].
212  See generally Tracey Lien, Uber Is on Growth Fast Track, Leaked Document Shows, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015, 4:52 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-0822-uber-
revenue-20150822-story.html [https://perma.cc/HQ5Z-MR7Y] (“[Uber] punches itself into
markets and spends big on advance teams, lawyers and lobbyists to fight opposition and gain
a foothold in markets around the world.”).
213  See Safe Rides, Safer Cities, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/safety/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Q266-W2LG] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
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on the vehicles for law-enforcement identification.”214 Ultimately, only time
will determine Uber’s ultimate success or failure in Nevada, but it is almost 
guaranteed to be a wild ride. 
214  Velotta, supra note 46. 
